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Fighting Foreclosure: Using Contract Law to
Enforce the Home Affordable Modification
Program (HAMP)
Arsen Sarapinian*
In 2009, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Obama Administration unveiled the
Making Home Affordable Program (“MHA”) to slow the foreclosure crisis and stabilize
the economy. A key component of the MHA is the Home Affordable Modification
Program (“HAMP”), a seventy-five billion dollar program designed to incentivize loan
servicers to modify loans for certain qualified borrowers. The Treasury estimated that
HAMP would permanently modify three to four million mortgages by the end of 2012;
however, HAMP has failed to meet its objective.
Under HAMP, if a borrower meets certain criteria, she will be placed on a three-month
trial period plan (“TPP”) where she will pay a lowered mortgage payment equal to 31%
of her gross monthly income. If the borrower makes this lowered payment for three
months and meets other requirements, the servicer should extend a permanent
modification with a reduced monthly payment. As written, however, the provision allows
servicers to deny permanent modifications even if borrowers successfully meet their
reduced mortgage payments.
Recently, borrowers began to bring common law breach of contract claims to enforce the
TPP, arguing that the TPP is a binding contract that requires servicers to grant
permanent loan modifications. Currently, there is controversy over the validity of the
TPP-based breach of contract theory and a split amongst the federal courts. This Note
provides an overview of the HAMP application process, examines the controversy and
split amongst the federal courts, argues in favor of upholding the theory, and provides
recommendations for national legislation.

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2013 and Senior Notes
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and commitment to helping homeowners navigate through HAMP. I’d also like to thank my wife,
Nona, and my family and close friends for their support and motivation throughout the writing process
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Introduction
The recent U.S. economic collapse triggered the worst recession since
1
the Great Depression. A significant contributor to the 2007 recession was
2
the mortgage foreclosure crisis. The numbers are staggering. From 2007 to

1. See Diana I. Gregg, World Is in Recession in 2009 in Wake of Financial Sector Crisis, BNA
Banking Rep., Jan. 6, 2009, available at LEXIS, News Library, BNABNK File (citing the World
Bank’s assessment that the current financial crisis is the “most serious since the 1930s”); Ben S.
Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Speech at the Council on Foreign Relations (Mar. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm (“The world is
suffering through the worst financial crisis since the 1930s . . . .”).
2. See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, The Subprime Virus: Reckless Credit,
Regulatory Failure and Next Steps (2011) (providing a thorough overview of the foreclosure crisis
and its effects on the U.S. economy); John Rao & Geoff Walsh, Nat’l Consumer Law Ctr.,
Foreclosing a Dream: State Laws Deprive Homeowners of Basic Protections 8 (2009), available at
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/state_laws/foreclosing-dream-report.pdf (“The
consequences of this foreclosure crisis are enormous, ripping through both Wall Street and Main
Street.”); Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster
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3

2011, foreclosures were initiated on 11 million properties. In an effort to
slow the climbing foreclosure rates, President Bush signed into law
H.R. 1424, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (“the
4
Act”). One goal of the Act was to restore market liquidity and stabilize
5
the U.S. economy. Section 109 of the Act authorizes the Secretary of the
Treasury (the “Secretary”) to create and implement a plan to decrease
the rate of foreclosures. In the spring of 2009, the Secretary and the
Obama Administration unveiled the Making Home Affordable Program
6
(“MHA”).
A key component of the MHA is the Home Affordable Modification
7
Program (“HAMP”), a program designed to encourage loan servicers to
8
modify loans for certain qualified borrowers. One of the goals of HAMP
is to reduce the rate of foreclosure by lowering borrowers’ monthly
9
mortgage payments to 31% of their monthly gross income. HAMP
First Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 Ariz. L. Rev. 727, 728–29
(2010) (“HAMP provides a compelling case study of the complex challenge of mitigating the effects of
an economic crisis brought on by high-risk financial products.”).
3. Lenders began foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties in 2007, 2.3 million in
2008, and 2.8 million in 2009. RealtyTrac: Year-End Report Shows Record 2.8 Million U.S. Properties with
Foreclosure Filings in 2009, RealtyTrac (Jan. 14, 2010), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosuremarket-report/realtytrac-year-end-report-shows-record-28-million-us-properties-with-foreclosure-filingsin-2009-5489. In 2010, lenders began foreclosure proceedings on a record 2.9 million properties.
Record 2.9 Million U.S. Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings in 2010 Despite 30-Month Low in
December, RealtyTrac (Jan. 13, 2011), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/press-releases/record-29million-us-properties-receive-foreclosure-filings-in-2010-despite-30-month-low-in-december-6309.
In
2011, 1.8 million properties faced foreclosure. 2011 Year-End Foreclosure Report: Foreclosures on the
Retreat, RealtyTrac (Jan. 12, 2012), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/news-and-opinion/2011-yearend-foreclosure-market-report-6984?accnt=13562.
4. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765 (2008).
5. 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2008) (“The purposes of this chapter are (1) to immediately provide
authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore liquidity and stability to
the financial system of the United States; and (2) to ensure that such authority and such facilities are
used in a manner that (A) protects home values, college funds, retirement accounts, and life savings;
(B) preserves homeownership and promotes jobs and economic growth; (C) maximizes overall returns
to the taxpayers of the United States; and (D) provides public accountability for the exercise of such
authority.”).
6. See HAMP Supplemental Directive 09-01: Introduction of the Home Affordable
Modification Program 1 (2009) [hereinafter HAMP Supplemental Directive].
7. A servicer is a financial institution that collects the borrower’s monthly mortgage payments
and has responsibility for the management and accounting of the loan. It is possible that the owner of
a mortgage also services it; however, many loans are owned by groups of investors who hire loan
servicers to interact with homeowners on their behalf. A servicer primarily profits from late fees
associated with late mortgage payments. Additionally, servicers, “unlike investors, generally recover
all their hard costs after a foreclosure, even if the home sells for less than the mortgage loan balance.
Servicers may even make money from foreclosures through charging borrowers and investors fees that
are ultimately recouped from the loan pool.” See infra Part II; see also Diane E. Thompson,
Foreclosing Modifications: How Servicer Incentives Discourage Loan Modifications, 86 Wash. L. Rev.
755, 765–68 (2011).
8. See HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 1.
9. Id. at 6 (“The borrower will only qualify for the HAMP if the verified income documentation
confirms that the monthly mortgage payment ratio prior to the modification is greater than 31 percent.
The ‘monthly mortgage payment ratio’ is the ratio of the borrower’s current monthly mortgage
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allocated seventy-five billion dollars worth of incentives to encourage loan
10
investors, servicers, and borrowers to work together to modify mortgages.
The Treasury estimated that HAMP would permanently modify three to
11
four million mortgages by the end of 2012. However, after its first year,
HAMP’s shortfalls came to light as data showed that HAMP produced
12
only 230,801 permanent modifications. It became apparent that at this
13
rate, HAMP would not meet its projected goal. According to a recent
report, “approximately 2.8 million borrowers had their HAMP loan
14
modification application denied or their trial [period plan] canceled.”
While the intentions of the proposed legislation were noteworthy, loan
servicers and financial institutions circumvented the program’s provisions
to protect their own interests. This resulted in a lackluster program that
incentivized servicers to modify loans but did very little to make those
15
16
modifications permanent. As a result, a flurry of litigation ensued.
The most controversial provision of HAMP is its three-month Trial
17
Period Plan (“TPP”). Under HAMP, if a borrower meets certain
requirements, she will be placed on a TPP where she will pay a lowered
18
mortgage payment equal to 31% of her gross monthly income. If the
borrower makes this lowered payment for three months, the servicer
should extend a permanent modification with a reduced monthly payment.
As written, however, the provision allows servicers to deny permanent
modifications even if borrowers successfully meet their reduced mortgage
19
payments. For example, during the TPP, the servicer may request

payment to the borrower’s monthly gross income (or the borrowers’ combined monthly gross income
in the case of co-borrowers).”).
10. See Braucher, supra note 2, at 729 (stating the cost of the program to be $75 billion and
examining the disappointing first year of the HAMP program).
11. See Cong. Oversight Panel, October Oversight Report: An Assessment of Foreclosure
Mitigation Efforts After Six Months 38, 43 (2009) [hereinafter October Oversight Report].
12. See Making Home Affordable Program: Servicer Performance Report Through March
2010, at 2 (2010).
13. See October Oversight Report, supra note 11, at 43–71 (discussing the shortfalls of HAMP
after six months of its inception).
14. See U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-12-296, Foreclosure Mitigation: Agencies
Could Improve Effectiveness of Federal Efforts with Additional Data Collection and
Analysis 3 (2012) [hereinafter Foreclosure Mitigation].
15. See generally Thompson, supra note 7 (arguing that HAMP does not require servicers to
modify loans but offers an incentive structure that is supposed to encourage loan modifications).
16. For an overview of HAMP-related lawsuits, see John R. Chiles & Matthew T. Mitchell, HAMP:
An Overview of the Program and Recent Litigation Trends, 65 Consumer Fin. L. Q. Rep. 194 (2011).
17. See Making Home Affordable Program: Handbook for Servicers of Non-GSE Mortgages
106–10 (version 4.0 2012) (outlining the TPP) [hereinafter HAMP Servicer Handbook].
18. Id. at 93.
19. Id. at 110 (“A borrower in a TPP may receive a permanent modification as long as the
servicer has received all required trial period payments timely and all other required documentation
from the borrower, including a fully executed Modification Agreement. Servicers should not modify a
mortgage loan if there is reasonable evidence indicating the borrower submitted information that is
false or misleading or if the borrower otherwise engaged in fraud in connection with the
modification.”).
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additional income documentation to ensure that the borrower is eligible
20
for a permanent modification. This tedious process and degree of
discretion allows servicers to deny permanent modifications based on
21
incomplete applications and insufficient income. Unfortunately, evidence
of servicer misconduct is well chronicled: Borrowers complain that
servicers lose their paperwork, make oral and written misrepresentations,
22
engage in delay tactics, and fail to follow HAMP standards. To date,
over 770,000 borrowers who entered TPPs were denied permanent
23
modifications and had their TPPs cancelled.
HAMP’s failures have caused borrowers to seek relief through the
courts. Nevertheless, many borrowers have trouble surviving the pleading
24
stage. Recently, borrowers began to bring common law breach of
contract claims to enforce the TPP. They argue that the TPP is a binding
contract that the servicer breaches when it refuses to grant a permanent
25
loan modification despite borrower compliance. Currently, there is
controversy over the validity of the TPP-based breach of contract theory
26
and a split among federal courts. Cases are often dismissed on the theory
27
that HAMP does not afford a private right of action, meaning borrowers
cannot simply sue to enforce a particular HAMP provision. They reason
that TPPs do not constitute valid, independent contracts, but are instead

20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See infra notes 22, 64, 106; see also TARP Quarterly Report, infra note 106.
22. Office of the Special Inspector Gen. for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, SIG-QR11-01, Quarterly Report to Congress 12 (2011) [hereinafter TARP Quarterly Report].
23. According to the most recent HAMP performance report, 770,829 trial modifications have
been cancelled. Making Home Affordable: Program Performance Report Through August 2012,
at 3 (2012) [hereinafter August 2012 Performance Report].
24. See infra Part III.A.
25. See, e.g., Picini v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 854 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273 (E.D.N.Y 2012)
(“Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants breached the TPP by accepting Plaintiffs’ payments
under the TPP and then failing to modify Plaintiffs’ loan.”); Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 762 F.
Supp. 2d 342, 351–52 (D. Mass. 2011) (discussing the plaintiffs’ argument that the TPP is a formed
contract and that the servicer breached it); Belyea v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP, No. 10-10931-DJC,
2011 WL 2884964, at *1 (D. Mass. July 15, 2011) (“Plaintiffs contend that the TPP Agreements
constitute binding contracts with Litton and that Litton failed to satisfy its contractual obligations.”);
Durmic v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 10-CV-10380-RGS, 2010 WL 4825632, at *1 (D. Mass.
Nov. 24, 2010) (“The TPP is a Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac ‘Uniform Instrument’ that has the
appearances of a contract.”).
26. See infra Part III.
27. See, e.g., Vida v. OneWest Bank, F.S.B., No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473, at *3–4 (D. Or.
Dec. 13, 2010) (explaining that courts agree there is no private right of action under HAMP); Manabat
v. Sierra Pac. Mortg. Co., No. CV F 10-1018 LJO JLT, 2010 WL 2574161, at *11 (E.D. Cal. June 25,
2010) (“Congress did not intend to create a private right of action for violation of HAMP against
lenders that received HAMP funds.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Marks v. Bank of Am.,
N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039-PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988, at *6 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010) (“Nowhere in
the HAMP Guidelines, nor in the EESA, does it expressly provide for a private right of action.”).
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28

part of the rubric of HAMP. This rationale is partly based on
29
constitutional preemption principles.
Conversely, other courts disagree with this rationale and allow
borrowers to assert contract claims to enforce TPPs, reasoning that while
HAMP does not afford a private right of action, it does not preempt state
30
common law. This approach is more consistent with American
jurisprudence, because courts generally allow plaintiffs to assert common
law claims to enforce federal programs. Thus far, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals is the only appellate court that has addressed the validity
of the theory, dismissing the preemption arguments and upholding the
31
theory. As a result, lower courts are mixed in applying the theory, and the
32
result is inconsistent decisions.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the HAMP application
process, with specific emphasis on the TPP. Part II first discusses the
recent controversy around the TPP-based breach of contract theory and
the split among federal courts. Part II then looks to the judicial treatment
of analogous federal statutes and suggests that courts uphold the validity of
the breach of contract theory and allow borrowers to attain foreclosure
relief through the courts. This Note concludes by recommending several
ideas for national legislation that can help achieve HAMP’s unmet goals.

I. The Mortgage Crisis
Several theories purport to explain the origins of the mortgage crisis.
While there is disagreement among scholars, the general consensus is that
33
34
subprime lending and securitization of mortgages were significant
35
contributors to the mortgage crisis. During the last forty years,

28. See infra Part III.A–B.
29. See infra Part III.A–B.
30. See infra Part III.C.
31. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 575, 586 (7th Cir. 2012).
32. See infra Part III.
33. Generally, subprime lending refers to lending loans that are designed for persons with
blemished or limited credit histories and that carry a higher rate of interest than prime loans to
compensate for increased credit risk. See Subprime Lending, U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/lending/subprime
(last visited Mar. 15, 2013). Statistics show that minorities are overrepresented in the subprime lending
market. Id.
34. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 763 (“In securitization, thousands of loans are pooled
together in common ownership. Ownership of the loans is held by a trust. The expected income stream
from the pooled loans together forms the basis for bonds that are sold to investors. Investors who
purchase the bonds do not own the loans, but they do own the right to receive payment based on the
loan payments. Bonds may be issued for different categories of payments, including: interest
payments, principal payments, late payments, and prepayment penalties. Different groups of bond
holders—or tranches—may get paid from different pots of money and in different order. The majority
of all home loans in recent years were securitized.” (footnotes omitted)).
35. See generally Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 15–19 (discussing how subprime lending,
securitization, and weak government oversight led to the mortgage crisis); Kurt Eggert, The Great
Collapse: How Securitization Caused the Subprime Meltdown, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1257, 1276 (2009)
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regulations on the mortgage market were loosened to encourage home
36
ownership and fuel economic growth. For example, Congress eliminated
interest rate caps on first-lien home mortgages and permitted financial
37
products other than fixed-rate loans. These new products included
38
adjustable rate mortgages (loans that start off with a low interest rate but
39
are adjustable for the life of the loan), balloon payment loans, and
40
reverse mortgages. Additionally, the emergence of securitization, a
process that allowed note holders to bundle loans with many others, divide
them, and sell them to investors who would then sell them on the securities
41
market, significantly changed the mortgage market.
But increased home ownership came at a heavy price. Eventually,
when interest rates increased and the U.S. economy faltered, borrowers
could not afford inflated mortgage payments. Servicers began to issue
foreclosure threats. At-risk borrowers were unable to refinance into
more affordable loans and lost equity in their homes. In states that follow
42
a judicial foreclosure model, lenders sought foreclosures through the

(arguing that securitization was a major cause of the subprime meltdown); Raymond C. Niles, Eighty
Years in the Making: How Housing Subsidies Caused the Financial Meltdown, 6 J.L. Econ. & Pol’y 165
(2010) (arguing that housing subsidies significantly contributed to the mortgage crisis); William Poole,
Causes and Consequences of the Financial Crisis of 2007–2009, 33 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 421, 425
(2010) (stating that the government encouraged the growth of the subprime mortgage market by
attempting to increase home ownership); Todd J. Zywicki & Joseph D. Adamson, The Law and
Economics of Subprime Lending, 80 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1 (2009) (arguing that subprime lending was a
contributor to the mortgage crisis).
36. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 16.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. A balloon payment is a mortgage that does not fully amortize over the term of the note, thus
leaving a balance due at maturity. The final payment is called a balloon payment because of its large
size. John P. Wiedemer, Real Estate Finance 109–10 (8th ed. 2001).
40. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 2, at 16.
41. See Eggert, supra note 35, at 1259 (“[Securitization allowed] subprime lenders [to] make loans
and sell them on Wall Street, where investment houses marketed securities backed by pools of
subprime loans . . . [allowing] subprime lenders [to] quickly unload much of the risk of the subprime
loans as well as recoup the money lent and relend it to new subprime borrowers.”). Additionally,
securitization created potential conflicts among the various interests involved, including investors,
note holders, and servicers. Braucher, supra note 2, at 745–46 (“Not only were servicers’ interests not
necessarily aligned with those of investors, but there were many potential conflicts among investors
because of their different interests in securitized mortgage pools, a problem popularly referred to as
the ‘slicing and dicing’ of home mortgages and potentially involving ‘tranche warfare.’”).
42. See John Carney, A Primer on the Foreclosure Crisis, CNBC.com (Oct. 11, 2010), http://
www.cnbc.com/id/39617381/A_Primer_On_The_Foreclosure_Crisis (stating that there are twentythree “judicial states” that require banks to initiate foreclosures through the courts); see also Cong.
Oversight Panel, November Oversight Report: Examining the Consequences of Mortgage
Irregularities for Financial Stability and Foreclosure Mitigation 12 n.17 (2010) (“Twenty-two
states require judicial oversight of foreclosure proceedings.”). Cf. Rao & Walsh, supra note 2, at 12
(stating that there are thirty-one non-judicial states, including the District of Columbia, leaving only
twenty “judicial states”). According to Rao and Walsh, the non-judicial foreclosure states are:
Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
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courts. In states that do not follow a judicial model, lenders did not need
43
to involve the courts and completed foreclosures more swiftly.
Borrowers in all states were often unable to attain foreclosure relief
44
through the court system. As a result, subprime lending, increased
homeownership, and economic instability led to an unprecedented home
45
foreclosure crisis, causing millions of Americans to lose their homes.
46
Lawmakers scrambled to reach effective solutions.

II. The Government’s Response: HAMP
Since 2009, the government has enacted various programs designed to
help borrowers avoid foreclosure in response to the crisis—including the
47
ambitious HAMP. The Treasury estimated that HAMP would modify
48
three to four million mortgages by the end of 2012. To date, HAMP has
49
only produced 1,076,747 permanent modifications, and “approximately
2.8 million borrowers had their HAMP loan modification application
50
denied or their [TPP] canceled.” Moreover, HAMP does not require
servicers to grant permanent loan modifications that are optimal to the
borrower. As a result, permanent loan modifications often leave borrowers
with a high debt-to-income ratio, contain an adjustable interest rate, do not
51
reduce the loan principal, and include a future balloon payment —leaving
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming, and the District of Columbia. Id. By implication, the “judicial
states” would be: Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin.
43. See Rao & Walsh, supra note 2, at 3 (“[In non-judicial states], mortgage holders who allege
that homeowners have fallen behind in their payments can bypass the courts and move directly to take
away and auction off homes. This denies homeowners due process protection comparable to that given
many tenants. It also places upon homeowners the heavy burden to get a judge to review the mortgage
holder’s claims and stop the foreclosure.”).
44. See generally Lauren E. Willis, Introduction: Why Didn’t the Courts Stop the Mortgage Crisis?,
43 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1195 (2010) (providing an overview of unsuccessful mortgage-related lawsuits).
45. See RealtyTrac: Year-End Report Shows Record 2.8 Million U.S. Properties, supra note 3
(documenting the rate of foreclosures).
46. For an account of the government’s response to the mortgage crisis, see generally David
Wessel, In Fed We Trust (2009) (describing the government’s attempt to prevent an economic crisis).
47. Other MHA programs include: Principal Reduction Alternative SM (“PRA”), Second Lien
Modification Program (“2MP”), FHA Home Affordable Modification Program (“FHA-HAMP”),
USDA’s Special Loan Servicing, Veteran’s Affairs Home Affordable Modification (“VA-HAMP”),
Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives Program (“HAFA”), Second Lien Modification Program
for Federal Housing Administration Loans (“FHA-2LP”), Home Affordable Refinance Program
(HARP), FHA Refinance for Borrowers with Negative Equity (“FHA Short Refinance”), Home
Affordable Unemployment Program (“UP”), and Housing Finance Agency Innovation Fund for the
Hardest Hit Housing Markets (“HHF”). See View All Programs, Making Home Affordable,
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/view-all-programs/Pages/default.aspx (last updated
June 15, 2012). There are also a host of other non-MHA loan modification programs that may be
available to borrowers.
48. October Oversight Report, supra note 11, at 38.
49. See August 2012 Performance Report, supra note 23, at 3.
50. See Foreclosure Mitigation, supra note 14, at 2.
51. See Braucher, supra note 2, at 764 (discussing the likelihood of a high re-default rate).
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borrowers at risk for re-default and foreclosure. Even at the outset, the
Treasury estimated that 40% of the borrowers who received permanent
52
loan modifications would re-default within only five years.
Part of HAMP’s poor success rate is due to the fact that loan
servicers, not lenders or investors, have vast discretion in modifying
53
loans. A servicer is neither a lender nor investor but is often a third-party
financial institution that is hired by investors to manage and account for
54
the loan. In other words, a servicer is tasked with interacting with
borrowers and collecting and managing the borrower’s monthly mortgage
55
payments. Servicers primarily profit from a monthly servicing fee, which
56
is a fixed percentage of the outstanding principal balance, but when a
57
loan becomes delinquent, the amount and nature of servicing changes.
A servicer can profit from assigning late fees to borrowers for making
58
late mortgage payments, and servicers can also make more money by
making temporary, unsustainable payment agreements than they can by
59
making long-term, sustainable modifications. Consequently, servicers
have a track record of extending TPPs but failing to extend permanent
60
modifications. Additionally, it is the servicer that decides whether to
61
foreclose or modify a loan. In some cases, a servicer can make a greater
profit from initiating foreclosure than from granting a permanent loan
62
modification. As a result of this structure, servicers often do not modify,
choose modifications that financially benefit themselves, or initiate
63
foreclosure proceedings, harming both homeowners and investors.
Legislators, consumer advocates, oversight bodies, and the Treasury
agree that servicer negligence and misconduct exacerbate HAMP’s poor
64
success rate. Common problems include loss of borrower paperwork,

52. See Questions for the Record for U.S. Department of the Treasury Assistant Secretary
Herbert M. Allison, Jr., Cong. Oversight Panel 3 (2009), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/
archive/cop/20110402030313/http://cop.senate.gov/documents/testimony-102209-allison-qfr.pdf.
53. See Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.’s “Preventive Servicing Is Good for
Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy”: What Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 Hous. Pol’y
Debate 279, 287 (2007); Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 Yale J. on Reg. 1,
22 (2010) (discussing the structure of the servicing industry); Thompson, supra note 7, at 770. See
generally Am. Securitization Forum, Discussion Paper on the Impact of Forborne Principal on
RMBS Transactions 1 (2009), available at http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/
ASF_Principal_Forbearance_Paper.pdf (explaining that servicers have vast discretion in determining
what kinds of modifications to approve).
54. See Thompson, supra note 7, at 765.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 767.
57. Id. at 765.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 771–72 (“[S]ervicers can make more money from foreclosing than from modifying . . . .”).
63. Id. at 772.
64. See TARP Quarterly Report, supra note 22, at 12.
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failure to follow program standards, and unnecessary delays that harm
65
borrowers while financially benefiting servicers. Despite these abuses,
the Treasury has yet to penalize or restrict funding to a single servicer for
66
any failure other than to provide data. According to the Office of the
Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, a
congressionally created watchdog agency, the Treasury’s lack of
enforcement stems from a fear of alienating servicers from participating in
67
HAMP. The Treasury recently explained that because participation by
the servicers is voluntary, “‘our abilities to enforce specific performance
68
are extremely limited’ and ‘aggressive enforcement [is] difficult.’”
Despite calls by the Office of the Special Inspector General and other
oversight bodies for the Treasury to get tough on servicers, the Treasury
gives servicers vast discretion in the modification process and instead
continues to devise new financial incentives for servicers to participate in
69
HAMP. The Treasury has issued dozens of revisions (“supplemental
directives”) to HAMP in an effort to encourage more loan modifications.
Although these directives increased the rate of loan modifications, lenders
granted only a total of 1,076,747 permanent modifications—as compared
70
with the projected three to four million—while canceling 770,829 TPPs.
Thousands of other borrowers are in a state of limbo—making monthly
payments in hope of attaining permanent loan modifications. The poor
success rate, coupled with the high risk of re-default attributed to
subprime loan modifications, indicates that HAMP has not met its
objective of helping borrowers hold on to their homes. Unsurprisingly,
borrowers have sought relief through the courts.
A. Who Participates in HAMP?
Initially, only servicers of loans that were owned or guaranteed by
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac were required to participate in HAMP;
however, due to governmental pressure and incentives, most loan servicers
71
currently participate in the program. Currently, over one hundred
72
servicers participate in HAMP. To participate in HAMP, a servicer must
execute a Servicer Participation Agreement with Fannie Mae, which acts

65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 13 (alteration in original).
69. Id.
70. See August 2012 Performance Report, supra note 23, at 3.
71. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 195 (“Servicers of loans that are owned or guaranteed
by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac are required to participate in HAMP. For all other servicers,
participation is voluntary. With monetary incentives and old fashioned arm-twisting, however, the
Treasury Department has successfully coaxed many of these servicers to participate as well.”).
72. For a complete list of participating servicers, see Contact Your Mortgage Company, Making
Home Affordable, http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/get-assistance/contact-mortgage/Pages/
default.aspx (last updated Aug. 4, 2011).
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73

as a financial agent for the U.S. government. HAMP is an economicbased incentive program that encourages servicers to modify mortgages
for certain qualified borrowers. For example, prior to HAMP, a loan
modification was estimated to cost a servicer around $500–$600 in
74
processing costs. Through HAMP, a servicer may be paid up to $4600 in
incentives over the course of three years for completing a permanent loan
75
modification. HAMP also provides additional incentives to borrowers
76
and investors, depending on certain criteria.
B. HAMP Eligibility Requirements
To become eligible for HAMP, a borrower must meet certain “pre77
screen” criteria. The most significant criteria require that (1) the
mortgage loan is a first lien mortgage loan that was originated on or before
January 1, 2009; (2) the mortgage loan is secured by a one-to-four-unit
property, one unit of which is the mortgagor’s principal residence; (3) the
property securing the mortgage loan is not vacant or condemned; (4) the
unpaid principal balance on the mortgage loan is less than $729,750 for a
one-unit property, $934,200 for a two-unit property, $1,129,250 for a threeunit property, or $1,403,400 for a four-unit property; and (5) the mortgage
78
loan has not been previously modified under HAMP. Interestingly, most
borrowers who apply to HAMP meet these criteria. According to the most

73. HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 1.
74. Joseph R. Mason, Mortgage Loan Modification: Promises and Pitfalls 7 (Oct. 3, 2007),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1027470 (citing $500–$600 as the cost
per loan modification).
75. A servicer may receive the following financial incentives for completing a permanent loan
modification: (1) a “Completed Modification Incentive” in the amount of $1600, $1200, or $400,
depending on the number of days the borrower is delinquent at the TPP Effective Date. For example,
if the borrower is 120 or fewer days delinquent (150 days from Last Paid Installment (“LPI”)), the
servicer will receive $1600. If the borrower is 121 to 210 days delinquent (151 to 240 days from LPI),
the servicer will receive $1200. If the borrower is more than 210 days delinquent (more than 240 days
from LPI), the servicer will receive $400; (2) an annual “Pay for Success” incentive in the amount of
$1000 per year for a period of three years. The “pay for success” payment will be payable annually for
each of the first three years after the anniversary of the month in which the TPP Effective Date
occurred, as long as the loan is in good standing and has not been paid in full at the time the incentive
is paid; (3) an annual “Pay for Performance” principal balance reduction. Certain borrowers whose
monthly mortgage payment is reduced by 6% or more and who make timely monthly payments will
earn this reduction equal to the lesser of $1000 ($83.33/month) or one-half of the reduction in the
borrower’s annualized monthly payment for each month a timely payment is made. The payment will
be payable annually for each of the first five years after the anniversary of the month in which the TPP
Effective Date occurred, as long as the loan is in good standing and has not been paid in full at the
time the incentive is paid. “This payment will be paid to the mortgage servicer to be applied first
towards reducing the interest bearing UPB on the mortgage loan and then to any principal
forbearance amount (if applicable).” See HAMP Servicer Handbook, supra note 17, at 123–25.
76. For a description of additional investor and borrower incentives, see id. at 125–28.
77. For a complete list of criteria, see HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 2.
78. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 195.
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recent HAMP records, 1,912,439 HAMP borrowers met these criteria and
79
were offered a TPP.
Congress and the Treasury intended HAMP to be inclusive so that it
could meet its target of modifying three to four million mortgages.
Unfortunately, the most problematic area for borrowers occurs during an
economic evaluation process after a TPP is initiated, but before a
permanent loan modification is granted. As a result, of the 1,912,439
HAMP applicants who were offered a TPP, only 1,076,747 were granted a
80
permanent modification.
C. The Application Process
The HAMP application process consists of several components. If a
loan is two or more payments delinquent and meets each of the “prescreen” criteria listed above, the servicer should make a “reasonable
effort” to “solicit” the borrower to complete a HAMP modification
81
application. This process requires servicers to send borrowers an “initial
82
package,” which is essentially a HAMP loan modification application.
Alternatively, if the borrower proactively contacts her servicer and
requests a loan modification, the servicer should work with the borrower
to determine whether she is at risk of imminent default and meets the
83
HAMP criteria. If the borrower meets the initial package criteria, she
84
will be offered a TPP. Finally, if the borrower makes all of the TPP
85
payments, she should be offered a permanent loan modification.
1.

The Initial Criteria

The HAMP application consists of “initial package” documents.
86
These documents include a Request for Modification Affidavit form, a
79. See August 2012 Performance Report, supra note 23, at 3.
80. Id.
81. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 195 (“A servicer is deemed to have made a
‘Reasonable Effort’ to solicit a mortgagor under HAMP if over a period of thirty calendar days:
(1) The servicer makes a minimum of four telephone calls to the mortgagor’s last known telephone
numbers of record, at different times of the day; and (2) the servicer sends two written notices to the
mortgagor’s last address of record, one letter via certified/express mail or via overnight delivery
service with return receipt/delivery confirmation and one letter via regular mail. If the servicer has
documented evidence that it satisfied this Reasonable Effort requirement without successfully
communicating with the mortgagor, then continued solicitation is not necessary. Successful efforts by a
servicer to communicate with a mortgagor are referred to as ‘Right Party Contacts’ under HAMP. If
Right Party Contact is established and a mortgagor expresses an interest in HAMP, then the servicer
must send a written communication to the mortgagor which contains and describes the documents a
mortgagor is required to submit in order to be evaluated for a modification.”).
82. See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
83. HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 13.
84. See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text.
85. See infra notes 100–104 and accompanying text.
86. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 195–96 (“The RMA is a standard form which seeks
general information about the mortgagor, the mortgagor’s finances, and the property secured by the
mortgage loan. Included in the RMA is a Hardship Affidavit. Every borrower seeking a modification,
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copy of the borrower’s most recently filed federal income tax return, IRS
87
Form 4506-T or 4506T-EZ, and copies of two recent pay stubs. Once
this information is submitted, the servicer has thirty days to evaluate the
88
borrower’s HAMP eligibility.
During the evaluation process, HAMP requires servicers to reduce
the borrowers’ monthly mortgage payment to 31% of their monthly gross
89
income. To achieve this, HAMP requires capitalization of accrued
90
91
92
interest, interest rate reduction, loan term extension, and principal
93
forbearance. Servicers are not required to reduce or set aside loan
94
principal but have discretion to do so. Even if borrowers meet these
criteria, they can be denied a modification based upon a net present
95
value (“NPV”) test. The NPV test is a formula that determines whether
it would be more profitable for servicers and the loan’s investors to
96
approve a modification or to foreclose on the property. If the NPV
result is higher for a modification than it is for a foreclosure, then the

regardless of delinquency status, must sign a Hardship Affidavit attesting that he/she is unable to
continue making full mortgage payments and describing one or more acceptable hardships as the
reason therefore.”).
87. See HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 7 (listing financial form requirements).
88. See Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 196.
89. Id.
90. Id. (“[T]he servicer must capitalize accrued interest, out-of-pocket escrow advances to third
parties, and any required advances that will be paid to third parties by the servicer. In addition, the
servicer must capitalize servicing advances that are made for costs and expenses incurred in
performing servicing obligations, such as those related to preservation and protection of the security
property and the enforcement of the mortgage.”).
91. Id. (“If necessary, in the second step, the servicer must reduce the starting interest rate in
increments of 0.125 percent to get as close as possible to the target monthly mortgage payment ratio.
The interest rate floor under this step is 2.0 percent. If the mortgagor has an Adjustable Rate
Mortgage (ARM) loan or interest-only mortgage, the existing interest rate will convert to a fixed
interest rate, fully-amortizing loan.”).
92. Id. (“If necessary, in the third step, the servicer must extend the term and re-amortize the
mortgage loan by up to 480 months from the Modification Effective Date, which is the due date for the
first payment under the permanent modification.”).
93. Id. (“If necessary, in the fourth step, the servicer must provide for principal forbearance. The
principal forbearance amount is non-interest bearing and non-amortizing. The principal forbearance
amount will be fully due and payable in the form of a balloon payment upon the earliest of the
mortgagor’s transfer of the mortgage property, payoff of the interest-bearing Unpaid Principal
Balance (UPB), or at maturity of the mortgage loan.”).
94. HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 9 (“There is no requirement to forgive
principal under the HMP. However, servicers may forgive principal to achieve the target monthly
mortgage payment ratio on a standalone basis or before any step in the standard waterfall process set
forth above. If principal is forgiven, subsequent steps in the standard waterfall may not be skipped. If
principal is forgiven and the interest rate is not reduced, the existing rate will be fixed and treated as
the modified rate for the purposes of the Interest Rate Cap.”).
95. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 196.
96. Id. (“This NPV formula takes into account various foreclosure factors such as the current
property value, foreclosure costs, and the expected resale time, and compares them with various
modification factors such as the value of the modified monthly payment and the risk of a repeat
default.”); see HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 4–5 (describing the NPV test);
HAMP Servicer Handbook, supra note 17, at 102–03.
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servicer “must approve the qualifying mortgagor’s modification as long
97
as all other requirements are met.” However, if the NPV result is higher
for a foreclosure than it is for a modification, then the servicer may deny
98
modification. If the borrower does not meet all of the eligibility criteria,
the servicer should explore alternatives to foreclosure prior to initiating
99
foreclosure proceedings.
2.

The Trial Period Plan (TPP) and Permanent Loan
Modification

If a borrower meets the initial criteria discussed above, the servicer
100
will offer the borrower a TPP, where for three months the borrower
must make monthly mortgage payments that are no greater than 31% of
101
her gross monthly income. The TPP is initiated once a borrower pays the
102
first month’s reduced mortgage payment. The borrower must then pay
the remaining monthly TPP payments on time to remain eligible for a
103
permanent modification. The HAMP guidelines provide that borrowers
“who make all trial period payments timely and who satisfy all other trial
104
period requirements will be offered permanent modification.”
Performance statistics indicate that this process is problematic. Of the
1,912,439 offered TPPs, over 770,000 were canceled and never became
105
permanent modifications. Servicers often claim that cancellations are
due to insufficient income or documentation on the part of the borrower,
while borrowers contend that servicers claim to lose their paperwork and
106
make misrepresentations. Consequently, many borrowers file breach of
contract claims against their servicers to enforce the TPP agreements.

97. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 196.
98. HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 4.
99. Id. at 18.
100. Id. The TPP could be longer if necessary to comply with applicable contractual obligations. Id.
101. Id. at 8, 17–18.
102. Chiles & Mitchell, supra note 16, at 196–97.
103. HAMP Supplemental Directive, supra note 6, at 17.
104. HAMP Servicer Handbook, supra note 17, at 106.
105. See August 2012 Performance Report, supra note 23, at 3.
106. See TARP Quarterly Report, supra note 22, at 12 (“One of the great frustrations with
HAMP, as expressed by legislators, consumer advocates, oversight bodies, and even Treasury itself,
has been the abysmal performance of loan servicers, which not only operate as the point of contact for
distressed homeowners seeking to participate in the program but also administer the loans on behalf
of investors. Anecdotal evidence of their failures has been well chronicled. From the repeated loss of
borrower paperwork, to blatant failure to follow program standards, to unnecessary delays that
severely harm borrowers while benefiting servicers themselves, stories of servicer negligence and
misconduct are legion, and the servicers’ conflicts of interest in administering HAMP—they too often
have financial interests that don’t align with those of either borrowers or investors—have been
described both by SIGTARP and COP.”); see also Arthur Delaney, HAMP: Obama Administration
Lets Banks out of Doghouse for Bad Mortgage Servicing, Huffington Post (Mar. 2, 2012, 4:24 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/02/hamp-mortgage-barackobama_n_1316873.html?ref=business&
ir=Business (“The most common reason for cancellations is insufficient documentation, according to
Treasury. But homeowners say the real problem is banks losing paperwork.”).
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III. The TPP-Based Breach of Contract Theory
Most district courts hold that HAMP does not afford a private right
107
of action. Nonetheless, borrowers may be able to succeed by asserting
common law claims on a TPP-based breach of contract theory. Under this
theory, borrowers who had a TPP but did not receive a permanent loan
modification argue that the TPP constitutes a formed contract between the
borrower and the servicer. They contend that the servicer breached the
108
contract by refusing to grant a permanent loan modification. Borrowers
propose that the initial TPP solicitation is an offer, the borrower’s
signature on the TPP contract indicates acceptance, and the trial
payments and submission of other financial materials constitute
109
consideration. The number of TPP-based breach of contract claims
continues to grow, and courts are divided as to the validity of the legal
110
theory. Most commonly, servicers are able to persuade courts that
federal law either conflicts with or preempts state common law. To date,
only one appellate decision—from the Seventh Circuit—has addressed
111
this issue; as such, the dearth of controlling case law has led to
inconsistent decisions among lower courts as to the validity of the TPPbased breach of contract theory.
A. The VIDA Rationale: Breach of Contract Claims Require
Independence from HAMP
HAMP affords no private right of action, and courts are not in
agreement on whether borrowers can assert common law claims to enforce
HAMP provisions. In December 2010, a district court in Oregon rejected
the TPP-based breach of contract theory in Vida v. OneWest Bank,
112
F.S.B. The Vida court explained that state common law claims cannot be
113
used to enforce federal program provisions. In Vida, a borrower argued
that she formed a valid contract with her lender when her lender offered
her a loan modification and she accepted the offer, entered a TPP, and
114
performed all required conditions. The borrower argued that the lender

107. See cases cited supra note 27.
108. See, e.g., Picini v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 854 F. Supp. 2d 266, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)
(“Specifically, Plaintiffs claim that Defendants breached the TPP by accepting Plaintiffs’ payments
under the TPP and then failing to modify Plaintiffs’ loan.”); Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 762 F.
Supp. 2d 342, 351–52 (D. Mass. 2011) (discussing the plaintiffs’ argument that the TPP is a formed
contract and that the servicer breached it).
109. See, e.g., Picini, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 273 (holding that plaintiffs met the contract formation
requirements); Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 351–52 (finding that plaintiffs met the offer, acceptance, and
consideration requirements).
110. See supra notes 107–109. Compare cases discussed infra note 27 (dismissing the theory), with
cases discussed infra note 112 (upholding the theory).
111. Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012).
112. Civ. No. 10-987-AC, 2010 WL 5148473 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 2010).
113. Id. at *5.
114. Id. at *1.
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breached the agreement by denying her a permanent modification and
115
initiating foreclosure proceedings. Under the TPP agreement, the
borrower agreed: “If I am in compliance with [the TPP] and my
representations . . . continue to be true in all material respects, then the
Lender will provide me with a Home Affordable Modification
Agreement . . . that would amend and supplement (1) the Mortgage on the
116
Property, and (2) the Note secured by the Mortgage.”
The lender moved to dismiss the case on the basis that the borrower
could not bring a TPP-based breach of contract claim because HAMP
does not provide a private cause of action and her claims were not
117
independent of HAMP. The borrower responded that, although her
claim was premised on representations made during the course of the
HAMP approval process, it was “not premised on an entitlement arising
under HAMP and, thus, [did] not depend on a private right of action
118
arising under HAMP.” Instead, the borrower argued that the claim was
119
based on the common law of contract. In other words, “representations
made by [her servicer] . . . themselves amounted to an enforceable
120
promise to modify her contract and refrain from initiating foreclosure.”
The Vida court, relying on several district court decisions in the Ninth
121
Circuit, disagreed and held that the facts and allegations in the complaint
were “premised chiefly on the terms and procedures set forth via HAMP
and [were] not sufficiently independent to state a separate state law cause
122
of action for breach of contract.”
Interestingly, the Vida court stated that servicers were not “wholly
immunized for their conduct so long as the subject transaction is associated
123
with HAMP.” This assertion implies that a common law breach of
contract theory could succeed if it is properly pled as a separate cause of
action. However, the Vida court did not articulate what is necessary to
assert a contract claim that is sufficiently independent of HAMP. The
implication of Vida is that borrowers are foreclosed from enforcing

115. Id. The borrower also asserted a fraud claim, alleging that she detrimentally relied on her
servicer’s oral and verbal statements that her “modification was underway” and “that no foreclosure
sale would take place.” Id.
116. Id. at *5.
117. Id. at *3.
118. Id. at *5.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. The court cited several district courts in the Ninth Circuit that dismissed the TPP-based
breach of contract theory, see id. at *3–4: Wright v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. CV 10-01723 JF (HRL),
2010 WL 2889117 (N.D. Cal. July 22, 2010); Hoffman v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C 10-2171 SI, 2010
WL 2635773 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2010); Manabat v. Sierra Pac. Mortg. Co., No. CV F 10-1018 LJO
JLT, 2010 WL 2574161 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2010); Marks v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 03:10-cv-08039PHX-JAT, 2010 WL 2572988 (D. Ariz. June 22, 2010); Aleem v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. EDCV 0901812-VAP (RZx), 2010 WL 532330 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2010).
122. Vida, 2010 WL 5148473, at *5.
123. Id.
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HAMP provisions if their claims are at all based on HAMP. Courts
continue to agree with Vida and prevent borrowers from asserting TPP124
based breach of contract claims.
Vida raises a question: Why can’t a borrower assert a common law
claim that relates to, or arises out of, HAMP or any other federal
program? Does HAMP conflict with or preempt state law? While the
court did not expressly rely on preemption principles, its dismissal of the
suit for lack of standing implies that HAMP conflicts with or preempts
state law. As the case law demonstrates, courts continue to wrestle with
125
preemption principles in the HAMP context. While some courts follow
Vida, other courts reject Vida and uphold TPP-based breach of contract
126
claims.
B. Does HAMP Conflict with or Preempt State Law?
Courts are reluctant to allow borrowers to assert breach of contract
claims to enforce HAMP because of constitutional preemption concerns.
The Supremacy Clause states that “the Laws of the United States . . .
127
shall be the supreme Law of the Land.” Thus, “state laws that interfere
with, or are contrary to the laws of Congress, made in pursuance of the
128
constitution are invalid.” There are three forms of preemption: express
preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption. In all forms of
preemption, it is presumed that federal law shall not supersede state law
129
unless it is the “clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” This is
130
referred to as the presumption against preemption.
Express preemption occurs when a federal statute expressly states
131
that it intends to override state or local law. In such a case, the intent of
Congress is explicit. Because there is no explicit statement of preemption
in HAMP, no one argues that it expressly preempts state law.
When Congress does not express its preemptive intent, two situations
might exist that can imply congressional intent of preemption: (1) field

124. See, e.g., Parks v. BAC Home Loan Servicing, LP, 825 F. Supp. 2d 713 (E.D. Va. 2011); Senter
v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 810 F. Supp. 2d 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Cox v. Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 794 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (D. Minn. 2011); Wittkowski v. PNC Mortg., No. 11-1602,
2011 WL 5838517 (D. Minn. 2011); Herold v. U.S. Bank, N.A., No. CV 11-08108-PCT-FJM, 2011 WL
4072029 (D. Ariz. 2011).
125. See infra Part III.B–C.
126. See, e.g., Picini v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, 854 F. Supp 2d. 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); Fletcher v.
OneWest Bank FSB, 798 F. Supp. 2d 925, 930–31 (N.D. Ill. 2011); Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,
762 F. Supp. 2d 342 (D. Mass. 2011); Darcy v. CitiFinancial, Inc., No. 1:10-cv-848, 2011 WL 3758805
(W.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2011); Belyea v. Litton Loan Servicing, LLP, No. 10-10931-DJC, 2011 WL
2884964 (D. Mass. July 15, 2011).
127. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
128. Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009).
130. Id. See generally Mary J. Davis, The “New” Presumption Against Preemption, 61 Hastings
L.J. 1217 (2010) (discussing the presumption against preemption).
131. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 56–57 (1990).
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132

preemption and (2) conflict preemption. Field preemption exists “if
federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable
133
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.”
In several cases, servicers have argued that Congress or the Treasury
intended to occupy the HAMP field by deciding not to afford borrowers
with a private right of action—thereby displacing state common law
134
suits.
Conflict preemption exists if it would be “impossible for a private
party to comply with both state and federal requirements or where state
law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
135
purposes and objectives of Congress.” Commentators argue that
conflict preemption is problematic because it has the “potential to be
broadly applied,” since interpreting federal and state objectives can be a
136
subjective process. In Wigod, the Seventh Circuit rejected a conflict
137
preemption argument in the HAMP context.
Some observers have advanced a new rule that would function as a
138
“true default rule” that creates a presumption against preemption. Such
a rule would automatically apply in the absence of clear and manifest
congressional intent to preempt. This proposed rule is “less rigid” and
“more forgiving in implied preemption cases,” giving breathing room to
the definition of actual conflict while maintaining focus on articulated
139
congressional objectives. While preemption law is well-defined in theory,
140
courts are often inconsistent in applying preemption principles.
C. A Better Approach: Upholding TPP-Based Contract Claims
Courts continue to wrestle with preemption concerns in the HAMP
context. In February 2012, the Eastern District of New York rejected the
141
Vida rationale in Picini v. Chase Home Financing LLC and did not find
142
that HAMP preempts state law. The court could not identify a single rule
that requires state common law claims to be wholly independent of federal

132. See Davis, supra note 130, at 1221.
133. Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. See, e.g., Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 576–77 (7th Cir. 2012); Bosque v.
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 350 (D. Mass. 2011).
135. Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (emphasis added) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
136. Davis, supra note 130, at 1221; see Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in judgment) (arguing against obstacle preemption as contrary to federalism principles);
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 227–29 (2000) (arguing that obstacle preemption
requires “imaginative reconstruction” of congressional intent).
137. Wigod, 673 F.3d at 578.
138. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 130, at 1217–20 (arguing for courts to consistently apply the
presumption against preemption).
139. Id. at 1217.
140. Id. (discussing the uncertain role of preemption doctrine in American jurisprudence).
141. 854 F. Supp. 2d 266 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
142. Id. at 274.
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143

law. In Picini, borrowers sued their servicer under several breach of
144
contract theories. The plaintiffs argued that they made all of their TPP
payments on time but were not offered a permanent modification because
145
the servicer engaged in “deny and delay tactics.” Soon after, the
defendant moved to dismiss the lawsuit using the Vida rationale, arguing
that there is no private right of action under HAMP, that the claim was
not sufficiently independent of HAMP, and that the plaintiffs’ claim was
146
“simply a HAMP claim in disguise.” The Picini court considered the
argument but did not find it persuasive. Instead, the court found that the
defendant failed to identify a source of law that provides “where a state
common law theory provides for liability for conduct that is also violative
of federal law, a suit under state common law is prohibited so long as the
147
federal law does not provide for a private right of action.” In denying
the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the Picini court implied that HAMP
148
would not preempt the TPP-based breach of contract theory.
149
Likewise, in Bosque v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the court suggested
that the only justification for the Vida rationale would be federal
150
preemption of state law. In Bosque, borrowers brought a TPP-based
151
breach of contract claim against their servicer. Similarly, the defendant
moved to dismiss the lawsuit on Vida grounds, arguing that the plaintiffs
152
were trying to “use state law as an indirect means to enforce HAMP.”
The court noted that the defendant did not prove that HAMP preempted
153
a state law claim, which implies that the only justification for the Vida
rationale would be a federal preemption of state law. Ruling in favor of
the plaintiffs, the court stated that the “fact that a TPP has a relationship
to a federal statute and regulations does not require the dismissal of any
state-law claims that arise under a TPP. Nor does the fact that the TPP is
154
a form contract created by the government change that analysis.” The
143. Id.
144. Id. at 271.
145. Id. at 270 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs alleged that their servicer gave them
conflicting instructions: While Plaintiffs were on a TPP, they were told by a servicer representative
that a permanent modification would be “pretty definite;” later, a servicer representative told them
that the loan modification was backed up and advised them to continue making payments after the
three-month period ended. Id. The Plaintiffs made payments for another seven months before they
were contacted by their servicer and told that they were being dropped from the TPP and that the
foreclosure action would resume. Id. at 270–71.
146. Id. at 273 (citation omitted).
147. Id. at 274.
148. Id.
149. 762 F. Supp. 2d 342, 351 (D. Mass. 2011) (dismissing the servicer’s argument that a breach of
contract claim must be independent of HAMP).
150. Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, FSB, 798 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (agreeing with the
Bosque rationale).
151. Bosque, 762 F. Supp. 2d at 349.
152. Id. at 350.
153. Id. at 351.
154. Id.
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Bosque court went on to note that if a “TPP is properly construed as a
contract between the parties in this case, then plaintiffs have standing to
155
bring suit in order to recover for any breach of that contract.”
156
Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. is the only appellate court
decision that addresses the validity of the TPP-based breach of contract
theory. In Wigod, the Seventh Circuit rejected a servicer’s preemption
arguments and reversed the district court’s decision to dismiss a TPP-based
157
breach of contract claim. There, a borrower executed a TPP with her
servicer that stated in part, “If I am in compliance with this Loan Trial
Period and my representations . . . continue to be true in all material
respects, then the [servicer] will provide me with a . . . Loan Modification
158
Agreement.” The borrower made all four monthly TPP payments on
159
time but was, nonetheless, denied a permanent modification. The
borrower brought a class action complaint against her servicer, alleging
that the TPP was a formed contract between the parties and that the
160
servicer breached the contract. The servicer moved to dismiss the suit,
and the district court, citing Vida, held that HAMP does not afford a
private right of action and that common law claims must be independent
161
of HAMP.
On appeal, the servicer argued that, even though the common law
claims were not expressly preempted, field preemption and conflict
162
preemption precluded the plaintiff from bringing a common law claim.
The servicer made a field preemption argument that the Home Owners
163
Loan Act (“HOLA”) occupies the relevant mortgage field. HOLA was
enacted “to provide emergency relief from massive home loan defaults
164
during the Great Depression.” It empowers the Office of Thrift
Supervision (“OTS”) in the Treasury Department to authorize and
regulate federal savings and loan associations and to preempt conflicting
165
state law by its regulations. Indeed, in one of its regulations, the OTS
declared that it “hereby occupies the entire field of lending regulation for
166
federal savings associations.” The Wigod court noted, however, that a
savings clause within the same regulation states that “tort, contract, and
commercial laws are ‘not preempted to the extent that they only
incidentally affect the lending operations of Federal savings associations or

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
673 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 575, 586.
Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 577 (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2011)).
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are otherwise consistent with the purposes of paragraph (a) of this
167
section.’” The Wigod court dismissed the servicer’s field preemption
argument, stating that because “OTS ‘has no power to adjudicate disputes
between [savings and loan associations] and their customers,’ and ‘HOLA
creates no private right to sue to enforce the provisions of the statute or
the OTS’s regulations,’” common law suits by “persons harmed by the
168
wrongful act of savings and loan associations” are not preempted. The
Wigod case demonstrates that neither HOLA, nor OTS regulations,
occupy the relevant field in HAMP cases.
169
In Wigod, the servicer also argued for conflict preemption.
Conflict preemption exists if it would be either impossible for a party to
comply with both local and federal requirements or if local law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
170
objectives of Congress. The servicer conceded that it is possible for a
party to comply with both state and federal law, but argued that common
law “would ‘substantially interfere with [its] ability to service residential
mortgage loans’ in accordance with HOLA and OTS regulations” and
“would ‘frustrate Congressional objectives in enacting [the 2008 Act] . . .
to stabilize the economy and provide a program to mitigate ‘avoidable’
171
foreclosures.’” The Wigod court rejected this argument, explaining that
a breach of contract claim does not place additional duties or obstacles
upon servicers in the HOLA context or in the HAMP context, but
instead compliments those statutes by requiring servicers to honor
172
agreements with borrowers.
It is unlikely that allowing borrowers to assert breach of contract
claims would prevent servicers from servicing residential loans. From the
borrowers’ perspective, contract law encourages servicers to enforce a TPP
or a loan under HOLA; it does not conflict with their ability to service
loans. Moreover, “a state cause of action that seeks to enforce a federal
requirement does not impose a requirement that is different from, or in
173
addition to, requirements under federal law.” This is particularly true in
the context of a breach of contract claim—where the claim is premised
on enforcing a formed TPP contract that was drafted by the servicer. The
breach of contract claim does not obligate servicers to comply with
additional, conflicting state laws, but merely acts as an enforcement
mechanism to hold servicers accountable for their promises and formed
TPP agreements. Coupled with HAMP’s poor success rate and complaints
of servicer misconduct, courts should be inclined to afford borrowers

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(c)).
Id. (alteration in original).
Id. at 576.
Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995).
Wigod, 673 F.3d at 578 (alterations in original).
Id. at 578–80.
Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 448 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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access to state-based remedies and allow TPP-based breach of contract
claims to move forward.
More importantly, TPP-based contract claims are consistent with
congressional intent. The purpose of the Act that authorized HAMP was
to “stabilize the economy and provide a program to mitigate ‘avoidable’
174
Providing an enforcement mechanism aligns with
foreclosures.”
congressional intent to modify loans and prevent foreclosures. While
servicers may argue that they should have discretion to modify loans and
not be obligated under contract law to modify loans for unqualified
borrowers, whether the person qualifies for a loan should be a question of
fact, not a question to be addressed at the pleading stage. The issue is
whether a borrower may assert a TPP-based breach of contract claim and
have such a claim survive the pleading stage. Courts should follow Wigod
and answer in the affirmative.
D. Looking to Other Federal Law and Programs by Analogy
District courts should allow TPP-based breach of contract claims in
the same way that courts allow plaintiffs to assert common law claims
based on other federal laws and regulations. Such examples include
HOLA and OTS regulations, as well as the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
175
and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”). These statutes are similar to HAMP in
that they are comprehensive federal statutes that neither provide a right of
176
action to injured parties nor expressly preempt state law. Nonetheless,
courts allow plaintiffs to assert common law claims based on these statutes
177
and regulations.
1.

Contract Claims Are Allowed Under HOLA and OTS

HOLA and OTS regulations are examples of federal statutory
schemes that can be enforced through state common law. In In re Ocwen
Loan Servicing, LLC Mortgage Servicing Litigation, Judge Posner
explained that, although HOLA gave OTS “exclusive authority to
regulate the savings and loan industry . . . [by] prescribing certain terms
178
in mortgages,” it did not grant the OTS power to “adjudicate disputes
179
between [savings and loans associations] and their customers.” Further,
HOLA did not create a “private right to sue to enforce provisions of the
180
statute or the OTS’s regulations.” Judge Posner went on to explain that
HOLA did not preempt common law remedies for people harmed by
savings and loans associations because it “would be surprising for a
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Wigod, 673 F.3d at 578.
See infra Part III.D.2.
Id.
Id.
491 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 2007).
Id.
Id. at 643.
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federal regulation to forbid the homeowner’s state to give the
181
homeowner a defense based on the mortgagee’s breach of contract.”
This same reasoning should apply to the HAMP context: Courts should
allow borrowers to bring breach of contract claims to enforce TPP
agreements and avoid foreclosure.
182
In Fletcher v. OneWest Bank, FSB, the Northern District of Illinois
adopted the Ocwen reasoning in the HAMP context and allowed a
183
borrower to assert a TPP-based breach of contract claim. Applying
Ocwen by analogy, the Fletcher court stated that since OTS-based
mortgages could be enforced by contract law, it would be “logical” that
the TPP—which fits the definition of a contract—could provide a basis
for a breach of contract suit “even if its terms are prescribed by the
184
federal government.” In the HOLA and OTS context, Congress did not
185
grant borrowers a private right of action and did not grant OTS the
186
power to adjudicate claims between savings and loans associations.
Nonetheless, borrowers are allowed to assert HOLA- and OTS-related
187
breach of contract claims in federal court. Likewise, HAMP does not
afford a private right of action and does not offer any adjudicatory scheme
188
for borrowers to bring suit. Accordingly, courts should be consistent and
allow borrowers to assert TPP-based breach of contract claims.
2.

Common Law Claims Under the Federal Insecticide,
189
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)

Plaintiffs may assert common law claims related to other federal
190
statutes, including FIFRA. FIFRA provides for federal control over the
191
distribution, sale, and use of pesticides. It requires that all pesticides used
in the United States be registered (licensed) by the Environmental
Protection Agency and be properly labeled so that they do not cause
192
unreasonable harm to the environment. As in the HAMP context,
FIFRA is a federal statute that does not afford plaintiffs a private right of
193
action, yet the Supreme Court has held that it does not preempt or
preclude plaintiffs from asserting common law claims to enforce its

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 643–44.
798 F. Supp. 2d 925 (N.D. Ill. 2011).
Id. at 930–31 (allowing plaintiff to bring a TPP breach of contract claim under HAMP).
Id. at 931.
In re Ocwen Loan Servicing, 491 F.3d at 643.
Id. at 643–44.
Id.
See cases cited supra note 27.
7 U.S.C. §§ 136–36y (2012).
See Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 452 (2005).
See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136, ch. 6.
Id. § 136a.
Bates, 544 U.S. at 448.

928

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
194

[Vol. 64:905

provisions. In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, a group of Texas peanut
farmers alleged that a pesticide manufactured by the defendant severely
damaged their crops, partly because the pesticide was mislabeled under
195
The plaintiffs brought claims of strict product liability,
FIFRA.
negligence, fraud, breach of warranty, and violation of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act—essentially arguing that the pesticide’s
196
warning label violated of Texas common law. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendant on preemption grounds, citing
7 U.S.C. § 136v(b), which provides that such “State shall not impose or
continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition
197
to or different from those required under this subchapter.”
On review, the Supreme Court overturned the district court’s
decision, ruling that § 136v(b) only preempts “state-law labeling and
packaging requirements that are ‘in addition to or different from’ the
198
labeling and packaging requirements under FIFRA.” The Bates Court
held that plaintiffs’ common law claims were not preempted because
they were “equivalent to, and fully consistent with, FIFRA’s misbranding
199
provisions.” In other words, the common law claims did not provide for
additional or different labeling requirements, but instead afforded
plaintiffs with a method of enforcing FIFRA guidelines. The Court
reasoned that, although FIFRA is a comprehensive regulatory statute
that sets out labeling requirements, it “does not provide a federal remedy
to [parties] who are injured as a result of a manufacturer’s violation of
FIFRA’s labeling requirements, [and] nothing in [the statute] precludes
200
States from providing such a remedy.” The Court also considered that
the “long history of tort litigation against manufacturers of poisonous
substances add[ed] force to the basic presumption against pre201
emption.” The Court added, “If Congress had intended to deprive
injured parties of a long available form of compensation, it surely would
202
have expressed that intent more clearly.”
Here, as in Bates, HAMP is a comprehensive program that does not
provide a federal remedy. Moreover, there is no legislative intent that
explicitly or implicitly calls for preemption of state common law claims.
Considering the rich history of civil litigation in contract, banking, lending,
and property disputes, it is unlikely that Congress and the Treasury meant
to preempt state common law. Absent any statutory language or legislative

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 448–52.
Id. at 434.
Id. at 435–36.
Id. at 436.
Id. at 447.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 449–50.
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intent, courts should apply the presumption against preemption and
uphold the TPP-based breach of contract theory.
Critics of this Note may argue that common law claims are simply
an attempt to enforce HAMP: Because Congress affords no private right
of action, no right of action can exist under state law. However, this
argument blends two principles into an unsupported rule. It is true that
HAMP affords no private right of action: Had Congress and/or the
Treasury intended to create a private right of action, it could have done so
by drafting that language. But it is inconsistent to assume that, because
Congress does not afford a federal remedy, borrowers are barred from
asserting state law claims that relate to federal statutes or programs. This
203
theory conflicts with several constitutional principles of preemption,
including the presumption against preemption. As demonstrated, Ocwen
and Bates provide appropriate analogous examples of courts allowing
plaintiffs to assert common law claims to enforce federal statutes and
regulations that neither provide a right of action to injured parties nor
preempt state law. Courts should be consistent, rely on these cases, and
allow TPP-based breach of contract claims to enforce HAMP.

IV. Legislation
Further legislation is necessary to help HAMP meet its objective of
slowing the foreclosure crisis. HAMP has many shortfalls: It has failed to
reach its objective of modifying three to four million loans, and the data
indicate that a significant number of borrowers encounter problems at the
204
TPP stage. HAMP’s shortfalls have led borrowers to seek relief through
205
the courts. While some borrowers have turned to the courts to enforce
HAMP provisions, Congress and/or the Treasury should pass legislation to
address the inconsistencies of court decisions.
The Treasury should start by amending the HAMP guidelines so that
permanent loan modifications are optimal to the borrower. Currently,
permanent loan modifications leave borrowers at risk for re-default
because the loans are unstable—often containing an adjustable interest
rate, not reducing loan principal, and including a future balloon
206
payment. These very terms were included in the sub-prime loans that
contributed to the foreclosure crisis. Loans that include such terms are
unstable in that a borrower’s monthly mortgage payment amount may
vary on a monthly basis. If Congress and the Treasury are serious about
stabilizing the economy and the mortgage market, they should preclude
servicers from drafting unstable loans. This process will reduce the risk of
re-default and the possibility of another foreclosure crisis.

203.
204.
205.
206.

See supra Part II.B.
Id.
See supra Part III.
See supra notes 2, 52 (discussing the risk of re-default).
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The Treasury should amend the HAMP guidelines so that servicers
are held accountable to TPP agreements. The Treasury can do this by
requiring servicers to grant permanent loan modifications to borrowers
who make all of the TPP payments. If a servicer has a legitimate reason for
not offering a permanent modification, it should have to explain the
specific reason for denial in writing. Servicers should not be allowed to
deny modifications for reasons such as missing documentation or
incomplete applications and should instead be required to provide the
borrower with an opportunity to respond to or amend any mistakes. This
process will limit servicers to denying borrowers for strictly legitimate
reasons.
Furthermore, the government should take an active role in the
modification process by providing oversight. Currently, the servicer and
the borrower are involved in most of the HAMP modification process,
with little intervention from the Treasury or other governmental agencies.
Instead, the Treasury should serve as an intermediary to ensure that
servicers only deny borrowers for legitimate reasons. If a borrower is
denied a permanent modification, she should have the right to file a
complaint and appeal to the Treasury or other governmental agency.
While a complaint or appeal is pending, the Treasury should temporarily
freeze the foreclosure process until a decision is reached. The Treasury
should have the authority to overturn a servicer’s decision and require a
servicer to grant a permanent modification if the borrower meets the
required HAMP criteria and terms of the TPP. Such a process would
better ensure that servicers make a good faith effort in following HAMP
guidelines and would allow borrowers to challenge servicer decisions.
207
The Treasury has contemplated creating an appellate process, but it
has yet to implement such a process. An appellate process could be
administered by the Treasury, governmental oversight agencies, or,
perhaps, administrative law judges. The Treasury and Congress should
consider all of these options and promptly implement a review process.
In cases where the borrower refuses to respond to or amend her
application, or if the financial information is indeed insufficient, the
servicer could end the HAMP application process but be required to
provide the borrower with other alternatives to foreclosure; servicers, for
208
example, could direct borrowers to all other MHA programs. This
approach is more consistent with the congressional intent of the Act—to
stop foreclosures and stabilize the economy.
The legislation should also seek to prevent judicial inconsistencies
and circuit splits. It should afford litigants with a private right of action to
207. See, e.g., Jon Prior, Treasury, FHA to Let Borrowers Appeal Mortgage Servicer Actions,
HousingWire (Feb. 1, 2012, 11:01 AM), http://www.housingwire.com/news/treasury-fha-let-borrowersappeal-mortgage-servicer-actions (discussing the Treasury’s plans to implement an appellate review
process).
208. See supra note 47.
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sue under HAMP. Alternatively, it could explicitly grant borrowers the
right to bring breach of contract claims to enforce TPP agreements. Such
rights offer borrowers an opportunity to challenge servicer misconduct
and provide them with a remedy in the foreclosure process. Additionally,
the legislation should clearly indicate that HAMP does not preempt
common law claims or defenses. This legislation would buttress the
Bosque, Picini, Wigod, and Fletcher decisions, which uphold the validity
of TPP-based breach of contract claims and provide borrowers access to
the courts. Critics may argue that enacting these policies would further
limit the chances for borrowers to attain loan modifications by dissuading
servicers from participating in HAMP, but Congress could solve that
problem by making HAMP participation mandatory. Enacting this
legislation would better ensure that HAMP meet its objective of slowing
the foreclosure crisis, allow borrowers not only to avoid foreclosure, but
also to access sustainable loans, encourage loan servicers to adequately
follow HAMP guidelines, allow borrowers to appeal modification
denials, and provide borrowers with a private right of action to sue under
HAMP.

Conclusion
HAMP has not met its expected goal of modifying three to four
million mortgages. This failure caused borrowers to seek relief through
the judicial system in order to keep their homes. The TPP-based breach
of contract theory provides borrowers with one possible strategy to avoid
foreclosure and receive a loan modification. Unfortunately, courts are
inconsistent in determining the validity of such claims. Courts that follow
the Vida rationale continue to preclude borrowers from asserting
common law claims to enforce HAMP. As this Note has demonstrated,
this approach is unfounded. Courts should instead follow the Seventh
Circuit’s approach in upholding the validity of TPP-based breach of
contract claims in the same way that courts allow common law claims
that arise out of HOLA, OTS regulations, and FIFRA. To avoid future
conflicts, Congress and the Treasury should enact legislation that amends
the HAMP application process, requires more governmental oversight,
and affords borrowers with a private right of action under HAMP.

